La mafia globale e le infiltrazioni in Germania

A trent’anni anni dall’assassinio di Giovanni Falcone e Paolo Borsellino, Theresa Reinold riflette sull’impatto di questi eventi sul “rule of law” in Italia. Si chiede, al contempo, anche quali altri paesi, come la Germania che commemorerà presto il quindicesimo anniversario della strage della ‘Ndrangheta a Duisburg, possono imparare dall’esperienza siciliana. Dopo decenni di paura, apatia e negazionismo, durante i quali valenti oppositori alla mafia quali Pio La Torre e il generale Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa hanno perso la vita, le stragi dell’estate del 1992 hanno segnato una svolta nella coscienza civile della società siciliana. Gli omicidi di Falcone e Borsellino hanno suscitato indignazione nell’isola e portato a una mobilitazione sociale collettiva contro Cosa nostra, spingendo la classe politica ad intraprendere un’azione più incisiva nella lotta alla mafia. Ne sono testimonianza l’invio dell’esercito in Sicilia da parte del governo nazionale; l’arresto di Totò Riina, dopo decenni di latitanza; l’approvazione di una più efficace legislazione antimafia; il potenziamento dell’educazione antimafia nelle scuole; i processi celebrati contro i politici di alto livello per collusione con la mafia. Queste azioni hanno avuto degli effetti tangibili. Soprattutto le politiche in ambito educativo hanno reso i giovani siciliani più consapevoli, rispetto ai loro coetanei di altre realtà geografiche, del ruolo giocato dalla criminalità organizzata nella loro società.

Reinold poi si chiede se lo shock prodotto dagli attentati del 1992 abbia rafforzato il “rule of law” in Sicilia. Conclude che sì, le stragi hanno fornito un importante impulso in questa direzione. A tale risultato ha concorso anche l’educazione alla legalità nelle scuole - già introdotta a partire dagli anni ’80 e potenziata dopo gli anni delle grandi stragi mafiose - così come anche le condanne del maxi-processo. La ricercatrice, però, avverte che ciò non significa che Cosa nostra sia stata sconfitta una volta per tutte, perché uno dei suoi principali punti di forza è la capacità di adattamento.

Nella seconda parte dell’articolo, Theresa Reinold riflette sulle implicazioni dell’esperienza siciliana per la Germania, dal momento che la presenza mafiosa non è solo un problema italiano, ma anche tedesco. La Germania si è trasformata in un rifugio sicuro per le organizzazioni mafiose italiane, favorite da un’ampia gamma di opportunità di investimento e riciclaggio, dall’assenza di sezioni investigative specializzate nel contrasto alle organizzazioni mafiose, ma anche – e soprattutto – da una società tedesca in gran parte apatica. Senza la consapevolezza del problema, tuttavia, non potranno essere esercitate pressioni politiche e, in assenza di simili pressioni, non verranno adottate le leggi necessarie. Ciò è ancora più allarmante se si considera che in Germania intere città come Erfurt e Lipsia sono significativamente infiltrate dalla ‘Ndrangheta. Attualmente, una commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sta cercando di chiarire esattamente quanto sia influente la ‘Ndrangheta nella Germania orientale. Reinold conclude il suo articolo sostenendo che la diffusione delle mafie italiane in Germania è favorita soprattutto dall’apatia della società tedesca, ma la lotta contro la criminalità organizzata inizia nella coscienza collettiva delle persone, come ha dimostrato l’esempio della Sicilia. Ecco il suo contributo scritto per noi. (Alida Federico)


"Basta mafia!"
How the stato di diritto asserts itself against organized crime
By Theresa Reinold
In Italy, May 23rd marks the 30th anniversary of a fateful event: on this day in 1992, the Italian mafia organization Cosa Nostra blew up judge Giovanni Falcone with half a ton of dynamite – along with his wife Francesca Morvillo, three of his bodyguards, and 300 meters of the highway near Capaci. The detonation was so intense that seismographs registered it as a small earthquake. Even today, Sicilians remember exactly what they were doing and how they were feeling the moment they heard about Falcone’s murder. For a brief moment, it appeared as if the world in Sicily had come to a standstill. Yet just a few weeks later, on 19 July 1992, Falcone’s close friend, judge Paolo Borsellino, suffered the same fate. In the weeks following Falcone’s assassination, Borsellino had feverishly investigated Falcone’s murder and Rome’s involvement in it.
One could speak of a chronicle of two deaths foretold – many Italians, including Falcone and Borsellino themselves, knew that prosecuting the mafia would probably cost them their lives. Yet in spite of it all, they took up the fight against the mafia and thereby triggered a revolution of legality the impact of which can still be felt today.
The effect of the 1992 attacks on collective memory in Italy was similar to the impact of 9/11 on American public conscience. For the first time, the majority of Sicilians said „basta“ – basta to being terrorized by the mafia, basta to the collusion between the mafia and politicians, basta to the Cosa Nostra’s disregard for the rule of law, and basta to the climate of fear. The broad social movement that emerged in the aftermath of the assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino in turn put pressure on political elites to finally take decisive action against the mafia. Rome sent the army to Sicily, arrested Totò Riina, the “boss of bosses” who had lived in hiding for decades, passed crucially important anti-mafia legislation, mainstreamed antimafia education in schools, and put several high-ranking politicians on trial for mafia collusion.
Now, how could the rule of law prosper in a territory where it historically did not exist? And what are the implications not only for Calabria – home of today’s most powerful European criminal organization, the ‘Ndrangheta – but also for Germany? Germany has turned into a safe haven for Italian mafia organizations, favored by a wide range of investment and money laundering opportunities, the absence of dedicated anti-mafia units in law enforcement institutions, but also – and above all – by a largely apathetic general public.
»See nothing, hear nothing, say nothing«: violence and apathy in Sicily in the 1980s For Italians, 2022 is in many ways an important year of commemoration. It marks not only the 30th anniversary of the attacks on Falcone and Borsellino, but also the 40th anniversary of the assassination of politician Pio La Torre and general Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa. Pio La Torre had initiated a draft law criminalizing mafia association and authorizing the seizure of mafia assets by the state. Costa Nostra reacted swiftly and murdered La Torre on 30 April 1982 together with his driver Rosario di Salvo. Subsequently, general Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa was appointed prefect of Palermo, yet he also died in a mafia attack on 3 September 1982, along with his wife Emanuela Setti Carraro and his bodyguard Domenico Russo. As shocking as these murders were, La Torre and dalla Chiesa were just two out of hundreds of corpses that littered the streets of Palermo during those years. Even at a time when Sicily practically resembled a war-zone, many were still denying the mere existence of Cosa Nostra. See nothing, hear nothing, say nothing – such was the attitude most Sicilians adopted vis-à-vis the violence inflicted by the mafia, which had become a shocking routine, according to the mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando.
The Sicilian expression futtitinni – roughly translated as “don’t care”, “don’t worry” – describes not only Sicilians’ carefree outlook on life in general but equally characterizes their attitude vis-à-vis the law in particular. The rule of law was something Sicilians had to learn basically from scratch, because for a long period of time, the central state had no effective presence in southern Italy. In 19th century southern Italy, the precursors of today’s mafias were able to establish a parallel state in which they imposed rules, levied a quasi-tax (the so-called pizzo), and used violence and corruption to maintain their influence. Yet asserting one’s interests through the barrel of a gun or through bribery – rather than through lawfully established channels – is the exact opposite of rule of law. However, for a long time, turning to the law to protect one’s interests was unthinkable for many Sicilians – the everyday violence inflicted by Cosa Nostra had simply become too normalized, the fear of opposing the rule of the mob was too strong, and the incentives to comply with the law were too weak.
This state of collective denial ended only with the beginning of the so-called maxiprocesso, which initiated a “cleansing of society”, as Francesco Petruzzella, the author of the book “La mafia che canta” put it. On 10 February 1986, the maxitrial begins as a major event of historic importance, during which more than 400 mafiosi are held accountable for their crimes in the rocket-proof high-security bunker of Ucciardone prison in the heart of Palermo.
All attempts by Cosa Nostra to undermine the trial fail: in 1987 maximum penalties are imposed on its leaders, which are confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1992.
This was a first, as previously the mafia had always managed to escape justice. With the maxitrial, however, the stato di diritto sent a clear message that from now on it would strike back. The groundwork for the trial had been laid by a number of courageous law enforcement officials who formed the so-called Anti-Mafia-Pool, a unit to which Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino belonged as well. In the fight against the mafia, the following rule had been confirmed time and again: isolation means death. The murder of judges and prosecutors by Cosa Nostra was often preceded by a phase of isolation during which the victims had tried to garner support in their fight against the mafia, but to no avail. Therefore, the establishment of the pool was a measure taken by the investigators to protect not only the results of their investigations but also their own lives.
The Supreme Court’s confirmation of the maxitrial verdicts sent shockwaves through Cosa Nostra, as it had been expected that the allies of Cosa Nostra (especially those within the long-standing ruling party Democrazia Cristiana) would, as always, ensure favorable judicial outcomes for the mafia. This time, however, the rule of law triumphed over mafia collusion, which prompted Totò Riina to order the assassination of Giovanni Falcone.
Sicilians say »basta!« With this decision, however, Riina had gone too far. The assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino sparked an unprecedented societal mobilization against Cosa Nostra. Paralyzed by fear for so many years, scores of enraged Palermitans now took to the streets. Petruzzella recounts that after the attacks he organized a protest march down the street where the Madonias lived, one of Palermo’s most powerful mafia families. The demonstrators called out the Madonias by their first and last names, which meant an open rebellion against Cosa Nostra that had been completely unthinkable until then.
In 1993, Leoluca Orlando, an outspoken opponent of Cosa Nostra and former mayor of Palermo, was re-elected to the city’s highest office and henceforth lobbied for a “Sicilian renaissance”, that is, the consolidation of a culture of legality on the island. The foundation for this cultural change had been laid by Palermo’s schools in the 1980s – in fact, the schools were one of the first sectors of society to express opposition to Cosa Nostra. In 1983, an Anti-Mafia School and Culture Committee was founded to raise a new generation of politically enlightened young people. The seed that was thus sown blossomed in 1992, when civil society dared an open rebellion against Cosa Nostra. In 1993 “education for legality” was declared an overarching goal by the Italian Ministry of Education. This has had tangible effects, as Sicily’s youth is nowadays much more aware of the role of organized crime in their society than young people elsewhere. Due to societal pressure politicians finally began to take more aggressive action against the mafia. Rome launched a massive campaign of repression against Cosa Nostra, sent the army to Sicily and, in 1993, caught the “boss of bosses” Totò Riina – who had been on the run for many years – while he was driving through Palermo in broad daylight.
Did the shocks of the 1992 attacks thus bring the rule of law to Sicily? The attacks certainly provided an important impetus for the development of a culture of lawfulness, which in turn benefited from the maxitrial and early efforts towards mainstreaming the education for legality the 1980s. Now, it is not as if the mafia had not killed on a large scale before. What then was different in 1992? The sea change of 1992 can be attributed on the one hand to the respective personas of Falcone and Borsellino, and on the other hand to the manner in which they died. Both judges were national heroes who had attempted to rid Sicily of the mafia, and both suffered a death that was as horrible as it was spectacular. The assassination of Falcone in particular – the terrorist nature of the attack, the apocalyptic images of the destroyed highway – has burnt itself into the collective memory of Sicilians.
The rule of law revolution that followed was the result of a wide range of political, judicial, and cultural measures, and it was successful precisely because of this multidimensionality. Mayor Orlando emphasizes that the mafia cannot be fought through law enforcement alone, because it is a criminal, an economic, and a cultural system. Antonio Balsamo, president of the Tribunal of Palermo, also confirms that after 1992 all attempts by the mafia to reestablish a state within the state were prevented by determined repression. However, an important aspect of the fight against the mafia – namely the relationship between Cosa Nostra and the state – continues to be shrouded in secrecy (this relationship is the subject of the ongoing Trattativa Stato-Mafia trial).
Now, it is one thing to notice the culture of legality when wandering the streets of Palermo’s prettified downtown area, which were considered uninhabitable in the 1980s. But if one asks the inhabitants of poorer districts such as Zen, Brancacchio, or Borgo Vecchio what they think of the mafia, one will often encounter a completely different perception of reality.
Carmelo Pollichino from the organization “Libera” recounts an anti-mafia event at a school in Borgo Vecchio, where a child had “tattooed” the word mafia on his arm with a marker. When asked what the mafia is, the boy replied: “The mafia is the organization that organizes our street festival.”1 In this boy’s reality, the mafia is an organization that gives jobs to his parents and throws parties. However, in an area where the mafia is in a better position to provide bread and circuses than the state, a culture of legality cannot take hold.
Despite these limitations, overall the changes triggered by the events of 1992 appear to be quite sustainable. The strength of civil society, people’s heightened awareness of the rule of law, the rigid anti-mafia laws, and the significant material resources available to law enforcement authorities make a relapse into the years of mafia terror unlikely. Francesco Lo Voi, former chief prosecutor at the Tribunal of Palermo, therefore considers Cosa Nostra to have been significantly weakened. This is also illustrated by an amusing anecdote told by his colleague Calogero Ferrara about an intercepted phone call between two mafiosi from Palermo and Trapani, in which the Trapanese commented that one chair had remained empty at the last meeting – insinuating that the mafioso sitting on it had been arrested – whereupon his Palermitan colleague countered: “You’re still lucky, they also took the chairs here.”2 The adaptability of the mafia This does not imply, however, that the mafias have been defeated once and for all, because one of their key strengths is their ability to adapt. According to Vito Lo Monaco, President of the Sicilian Research and Cultural Center “Pio La Torre”, we have witnessed, since the early 1990s, a transition from a mafia stragista that commits massacres to a mafia mercatista that has infiltrated large parts of the legal economy.3 This applies not only to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra but also to the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, which, in the shadow of the Cosa Nostra, has risen to become the most powerful criminal organization in Europe, with an estimated annual turnover of 53 billion Euros. From its homeland ‘Ndrangheta controls large parts of the global cocaine trade but also earns money from other illegal businesses such as prostitution and money laundering. While Sicily is often referred to as a showcase for the revolution of legality, Calabria is seen as a backward and rugged outlaw territory.
Now, why was it possible to establish a culture of legality in Sicily but not (yet) in Calabria? Calabria is often compared to Sicily in the 1970s or 1980s: much like Sicily during those decades, the central government does not have a sufficient presence in Calabria today. In the case of Sicily, the government in Rome realized only in 1992 that a stronger presence of the state was needed to disempower para-statal actors. Calabria, by contrast, remains to this day a marginalized, economically backward region which, according to prosecutor Calogero Ferrara, has suffered even greater neglect by the central government in Rome than Sicily: “The state invested a lot in Sicily after 1992, the prosecutor’s office comprised seven or eight people in 1992, now we’re 60, the Squadra Mobile of Palermo has almost the same personnel as in Milan, even though Milan is so much bigger. So in Calabria none of this happened, only in the last fifteen years the first mafia cases were beginning to be investigated in Calabria (…), but the movement is very very slow.”4 Another important difference between Sicily and Calabria is the level of violence: unlike Cosa Nostra, the ‘Ndrangheta has prudently avoided excessive violence in order not to provoke a comparable backlash from the population. While civil society is extremely active in Sicily, it has had a much harder time in Calabria. Anna Sergi, a Calabrian anti-mafia researcher, describes her fellow citizens as apathetic and weary.5 Apart from the strength of civil society, another important difference lies in structure of the respective mafia organizations: the ‘Ndrangheta is more family-based and less porous than Cosa Nostra; therefore it counts less people in its ranks who are willing to collaborate with law enforcement. This in turn complicates the work of the prosecutors. Although Calabria has an extremely committed judiciary, it also demonstrates how difficult it is for a committed minority to overcome the apathy of the majority. Currently the Rinascita-Scott trial is taking place in Calabria, named after the eponymous police operation which took place in the fall of 2019, during which 334 individuals were arrested in countless coordinated actions involving a total of 3000 police forces. Rinascita-Scott is the counterpart to the Sicilian maxiprocesso of the 1980s; over 400 ‘ndranghetisti and their accomplices in political and business circles are to be held accountable. However, the monumental trial has received regrettably little media attention.
This is partly because the mafia mercatista has less potential for scandalization and emotionalization than the mafia stragista, which sat in the dock of the Palermitan maxitrial.
Emotions, however, are an important driver of societal mobilization, which in Calabria has been weak and inconsistent.
Yet there is hope. Calabria’s famous anti-mafia prosecutor Nicola Gratteri himself has described the Rinascita-Scott trial as a milestone in the fight against the mafia. Gratteri has apparently immunized the public prosecutor’s office of Catanzaro against infiltration by the ‘Ndrangheta – as evidenced by a mafioso’s complaint in an intercepted telephone conversation that ever since Gratteri’s arrival the ‘Ndrangheta was having great difficulties to obtain secret information from the prosecutor’s office. Gratteri had blocked everything, the mafioso complained. Now, even though a clean judiciary is an important factor for strengthening the rule of law, the judiciary does not operate in isolation from its political and sociocultural environment. As the example of Sicily shows, fundamental change requires a multidimensional approach that takes into account judicial, political, and socio-cultural variables. Only in conjunction can these factors trigger a veritable revolution of legality. One must therefore hope that Rinascita-Scott will awaken the Calabrese from their apathy, because a new beginning is highly unlikely in the absence of a changed societal awareness.
Germany – an ideal breeding ground for organized crime Now, mafia infiltration is not only an Italian problem, but a German one as well. Surprisingly, however, hardly anyone in this country is interested in this topic, and unfortunately public disinterest provides the ideal breeding ground for the spread of criminal infiltration. The association “mafianeindanke, e.V.” therefore aims to sensitize both the population at large as well as policy-makers to the fact that the Italian mafias are also active in Germany. An important demand of the association is the initiation of legislative reforms to enable a more effective repression of organized crime in Germany. Compared to the far-reaching Italian antimafia legislation, the legislative leeway in this country is much narrower, which has also time and again unnerved Italian investigators involved in cross-border operations. For example, an Italian prosecutor reports that his request to tap the phone of a murder suspect in Germany was turned down three times by German authorities. In Italy, the prosecutor said, he would have had no problem getting an authorization to wiretap the suspect’s phone. According to the prosecutor, in Germany and other European countries where the mafia is now active, a legislative framework to effectively prosecute the mafia simply does not exist.6 However, without an awareness of the problem, political pressure will not be generated, and in the absence of political pressure necessary reforms will not be initiated. This is even more alarming when considering that in Germany entire cities such as Erfurt and Leipzig are now in the hands of the ‘Ndrangheta, at least according to mafia expert Petra Reski.7 She has experienced the dangerousness of the mafia firsthand. Apparently, her journalistic investigations are being watched by the highest political circles – none other than Marcello Dell’Utri, a close confidante of Silvio Berlusconi who has been sentenced to several years in prison for collusion with the mafia, threatened her with a lawsuit for violation of personal rights.
Even more worrisome, however, are the threats against life and limb that Reski has had to endure. She does not want to talk about all of them – her fear of retaliation is simply too great. The mafia’s connections to the highest political circles in Germany appear to be particularly alarming. In the 1990s, according to Reski, these connections even extended into state governments, especially those in Thuringia, North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg.
Reski’s assessment may seem extreme, but Italian justice operators regard it as quite realistic.
According to Gratteri, the German authorities do not take the dangers posed by the ‘Ndrangheta seriously. Yet at least a parliamentary committee of inquiry has been set up in Thuringia, which is currently seeking to clarify exactly how influential the ‘Ndrangheta is in eastern Germany.
In other states such as Baden-Württemberg the willingness to investigate is much less pronounced – and this even though, or perhaps precisely because, the mafia has a strong presence in the “Ländle”. For instance, according to Italian prosecutors many Sicilians and Calabrese were involved in the construction of “Stuttgart 21”. Mafia expert Wolfgang Rahm of the State Criminal Police Office of Baden-Württemberg deems this entirely plausible.
According to him, the mafia is nowadays active wherever a lot of money can be made with a low risk of detection, for instance in large-scale construction projects. Nevertheless, the question of potential mafia involvement in the construction of “Stuttgart 21” is a non-issue in this country – politicians and the judiciary seem to have no interest in bringing an already controversial project even more into the public focus.
The case of Mario Lavorato is another indicator of the extent of collective denial in Baden-Württemberg. The popular Stuttgart restaurateur, mafioso and close buddy of CDU politician and former Baden-Württemberg governor Günther Oettinger was arrested in 2018 and later sentenced in Italy to almost eleven years in prison. Rahm had coordinated the operation that led to Lavorato’s arrest and subsequently demanded follow-up investigations, especially financial investigations. After this demand, however, he was relieved of his duties – or as the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” put it less diplomatically, “neutralized”.8 Apparently, the authorities in Baden-Württemberg do not want to hear unpleasant truths about mafia infiltration in their state and instead prefer to fight those who oppose the mafia. “For years, people in Stuttgart held their hands over Lavorato,” says Rahm, “he was very cozy with Oettinger but it was not only Oettinger who held his hand over Lavorato”.9 In light of these outrageous-seeming events, one may well ask whether it is not ultimately ourselves who – at least as far as the fight against the mafia is concerned – are still learning how the rule of law works. One thing is certain: the spread of the mafias in Germany is favored above all by public apathy. Yet apathy kills, and the successful fight against organized crime begins in people’s collective consciousness. In Germany, however, considerable sensitization is still necessary.

1 Personal communication, Palermo, 3 August 2021.
2 Personal communication, Palermo, 4 August 2021.
3 Personal communication, Palermo, 8 September 2021.
4 Personal communication, Palermo, 4 August 2021.
5 Personal communication via Zoom, 2 July 2021.
6 Personal communication with Calogero Ferrara, 4 August 2021.
7 Cf. Petra Reski, Die Mafiose von nebenan, www.petrareski.com.
8 Stefan Mayr and Markus Zydra, Operation Styx, in: "Süddeutsche Zeitung", 3 October 2020.
9 Personal communication, 2 December 2021.